wanting, with expectations evolving more quickly than the institutions. In the early 1990s, 'permissive consensus', which enabled the elite-brokered rule that underpinned the EU was thrown into question by the Danish and French referendums on the Maastrich Treaty (Norris 1997) . It is unclear whether representative institutions can generate the legitimacy to replace the permissive consensus. Turnout for European Parliament elections is low, and parties focused on Europe-wide issues have yet to form, leaving candidates to focus on national issues. Much policy continues to be formed by relatively independent regulatory commissions. There is little worry that the EU might become an illegitimate tyranny: its structure is relatively 'safe' in that it is well checked by national governments, judicial review, and elections (Moravcsik 2002) . But it is not clear whether the EU can find the democratic legitimacy to push forward with a deeper integrationthat is, it lacks the responsive flexibility that a confident and connected people will give its government (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Pammett, this volume) .
Although the institutional differences between the EU and the established democracies do not allow direct comparison, at a broader level the EU serves as a limiting metaphor for a more general condition. It is in this sense that the 'democratic deficit' metaphor is apt, as it suggests a set of problems that are well short of crisis.
Neither the EU nor the established democracies-the vast number of which are EU members-are failing. Over the last several decades, there has been little to bear out the 1975 predictions of the Trilateral Commission's Crisis of Democracy, which expressed the fear that an excess of political demand would cause democratic institutions to revert to authoritarianism. The problems of the developed democracies today are less dramatic, consisting in a widespread citizen malaise with respect to the formal institutions, and common views among citizens that political institutions underperform. The 'deficit' concept suggests that we think about democratic malaise structurally, as a misalignment between citizen capacities and demands, and in terms of the capacities of political institutions to aggregate citizen demands and integrate them into legitimate and effective governance.
From this perspective, the EU challenges look much like those common to the developed democracies. The list is well-known. As it must protect national identities and interests as well as minorities, the EU cannot function as a majoritarian manner, and thus lacks the capacity for decisiveness. It handles some protections through federal structures, others though subsidiarity, and still others through independent judicial review. Most developed democracies are evolving along similar trajectories. In addition, the EU functions to regulate trade and market integration, responding less to citizens than to market forces, which in itself requires regulatory processes that are relatively insulated from 'politics'-including democratic politics. Likewise for the developed democracies.
Finally, over the last half century or so, governing has become increasingly technical and complex: no citizen can hope to know more than a tiny fraction of the business of government. The result, of course, is that government is very much a matter for experts, who at best attempt to uphold the public trust, and at worst govern as disconnected technocrats.
Our received models of electoral democracy have had the advantage of clear lines of direction from, and accountability to, majorities or majority coalitions. Outside of questions as to whether 'majoritarianism' should be equated with democracy (it should not), the electoral machinery of democracies is an increasingly poor fit with the complex, pluralistic, multi-level business that governing has become. Our societies now seem to be developing more rapidly than their institutions of government-in terms of citizen expectations and values, in terms of complexity and demands for sophisticated performances, in terms of pluralism, and in terms of levels and scales of organization.
Under these circumstances, the most common and least costly form of citizen participation-voting for representatives-has less functional value.
Yet these developments do not make citizen participation less important for governing. It is because democracies build in responsiveness and accountability to the people that they have reflexive capacities to form collective wills. Democracies enable their societies to benefit from evolving consensus where possible. Where consensus remains elusive, democracies transform conflict into discourse, where it can serve a creative rather than destructive role. At the limit, democratic deficits undermine the capacities of democratic political systems to evolve and reform into ever more effective and legitimate agents of citizens. The notion of a 'democratic deficit' calibrates the problem: the misalignment in the established democracies is not a 'crisis.' Rather, the concept identifies long-term problems which, if left unattended, are likely to gradually undermine the legitimacy and capacities of governments.
What Should We Expect? Participation and Trust
To what extent can democratic deficits be narrowed through more citizen participation? This dimension of the question also requires perspective, since the same trends that open deficits may also limit participatory responses. Those who first emphasized the complexity of governing and its strategic consequences-Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter-concluded that effective citizen participation is limited to 5 choosing an elite in competitive elections. In the face of governing structures that depend upon professionals and favour concentrated power, citizens can at best play a passive and mostly retrospective role in checking elites who abuse their offices. These expectations have empirical relevance even today. In a study of citizen views of participation in the US, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) argue that citizens do not like 'politics'; they would prefer that politicians do their jobs while they get on with their lives. On average, citizens are averse to conflict. They are interested neither in the constant engagement necessary to communicate their preferences (when they have them), nor in disciplining politicians to attend to them. Rather, they want to trust politicians to look after the public good-though, of course, their trust is often disappointed, which in turn reinforces disaffection. Those who believe more participation is the answer to democratic deficits, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue, are waging an uphill battle.
Although Hibbing and Theiss-Morse overstate their case (Dalton 2007) , such studies are important for calibrating expectations for participation in a healthy democracy (Moravcsik 2002; Van Deth 2000) . No citizen can attend to, let alone master, every decision that affects them. Nor, given the range of possible activities and satisfactions in today's societies, should we expect citizens to choose attentiveness to politicsparticularly conflict-oriented politics-over competing forms of engagement: family, friends, occupations, hobbies, recreation, and entertainment. In the developed democracies with their high degrees of institutional and system differentiation, political organization does not encompasses these other domains, and so citizens are faced with trade-offs. From an economic perspective, the political resources any citizen is able to marshal will be scarce.
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A good democracy should enable citizens to optimize their political resources. Ideally, citizens should be able to focus their lowest cost resource-voting-on choosing representatives who will fight most of their battles and protect most of their interests.
They may join associations that fight other battles. In both cases, citizens would judge whether their interests align closely enough with their representatives-whether they are formally elected or informally selected-that they can trust them as political proxies (Warren 1996 (Warren , 2000 . To participate in these ways, citizens do not need to participate directly in decision-making, but they do need to know something about their representatives' trustworthiness, based on judgments about alignments of interests and value. They need to participate to the extent that they can ensure that they are, in fact, being represented. In many areas of government-typically those overseen by executive bureaucracies or quasi-judicial commissions-citizens may simply decide that public officials share their interests, and will uphold the trust placed in them by the public. They may decide that their representative proxies will alert them when and if their trust appears misplaced. Under these circumstances, citizens would be able to allocate their high-cost political resources to the few areas where political conflicts exist-where they have reason to mistrust government or their representatives-and where the investment of knowledge, time, and attentiveness may make a difference. In this way, a healthy democracy would enable citizens to divide their relationships to government between those of active participation and those of trust based on informed deference. In turn, this division of labour would enable citizens to deploy their political resources to those issues that are most contested, and to which trust is least warranted. The political institutions of a democracy should strive to underwrite these participatory expectations.
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Even measured against these more modest expectations, however, political institutions in established democracies are in deficit. The easiest form of participation, voting, has been stagnant at best in established democracies over the last several decades (Franklin et. al. 2004, 11) , and in EU elections has been at markedly lower levels than in national votes. Citizens are now more likely to distrust their political institutionsparticularly legislatures-than a few decades ago. They are more likely to judge that government performance has deteriorated. They are less inclined to identify with political parties, which remain the key institutions for translating public opinion into government (Pharr and Putnam 2000, Rosenblum 2008 Other developments also suggest that political institutions based on electoral representation are failing to generate the legitimacy necessary for many government functions. Innovations driven by gridlocked government and poorly performing programs began a few decades ago, as evidenced by the rapid proliferation of 'public engagement' devices including, for example, citizen juries and panels, advisory councils, stakeholder meetings, lay members of professional review boards, representations at public hearings, public submissions, citizen surveys, deliberative polling, deliberative forums, focus groups, and advocacy group representations Smith 2005 Smith , 2008 Gastil and Levine 2005; Fung 2006a ). These developments are not in themselves evidence of democratic deficits in electoral institutions, but they do suggest that there is much necessary political work generated within complex, pluralized democracies is not accomplished through formal electoral democracy.
While the general patterns of disaffection are clear, the causes are not. There is disagreement as to whether the political disengagement of citizens should be attributed to the poor performance of political institutions (Pharr and Putnam 2000, Dalton 2004) ; to the increasing capacities of new generations of better educated, more informed, less deferential citizens to be critical of those institutions (Dalton 2004; Inglehart 1997; Nevitte 1996; Norris 1999) ; to a broader civic phenomenon of declining participation in the social groups and networks that are vital to foster norms of trust and reciprocity (Putnam 1995 (Putnam , 2000 ; or to a fundamental popular distaste for the conflict-ridden messiness of politics and a general disinterest in public policy debates Theiss-Morse 2001, 2002) .
Electoral Representation Deficits
Not every actionable diagnosis requires that causes be pinpointed precisely.
Deficits in electoral representation are a case in point: because electoral representation forms the most visible connective tissue between the people and decision-makers, issues here are likely to be interconnected with most of the possible causes of democratic deficits. While I do not address causalities here, their relevance to normative democratic theory depends on how we cast the normative expectations. What should electoral representation achieve, normatively speaking?
All forms of electoral representation share three formal features which specify the extent to which they have democratic content. Through elections representatives are authorized to represent those who inhabit geographical constituencies. Electoral representation is held to be egalitarian and inclusive owing to the universal franchise.
Every member of an electoral unit, excluding those unfit or not yet fit to exercise the responsibilities of citizenship, is entitled to one vote. Subsequent elections function to hold representatives accountable for their performance while in office (Pitkin 1967; Mansbridge 2003; Urbinati and Warren 2008, Warren 2008) . These three features include normative criteria: institutions that are inadequate or incomplete in one or more of these dimensions are also less than democratic-they are 'in deficit' from a democratic perspective.
In practice, democratic deficits appear in each of these three dimensions of representation (see, e.g., Fung 2006a). With respect to authorization, for example, citizens may have unstable preferences which are neither adequately formed by the electoral process, nor communicated by the blunt instrument of the vote. Elected leaders often claim mandates based on very thin evidence, since voting is information poor.
Single Member Plurality (SMP) systems compound the information problem by limiting the choices of voters, usually to a maximum of two viable parties. The stagnation of voting itself diminishes the significance of electoral authorization. In the 2006 federal election in Canada, for example, the Conservatives were able to form a government based on a 36.3 percent share of the vote. But because turnout was only 64.7 percent, the government was authorized by a mere 23.5 percent of eligible voters. This outcome may in part be the result of the preference of the strongest political party to form a 'minority government' rather than a multi-party coalition, as is more common in Europe, particularly in countries with proportional representation electoral systems. However, a similar phenomenon can arise as a result of other institutional arrangements and political practices as well.
Another problem is that the roles of political parties are increasingly ambiguous.
In theory, parties put forward platforms for which they seek authorization; in doing so, they enable voters to authorize substantive policy preferences. Yet broad declines in party identification suggest that party elites should have less confidence that votes are signalling approval or disapproval of a party's proposal policies and positions-a deficit that is particularly pronounced in Canada, where voters are four to five times more likely to declare an absence of partisan ties than Americans or Britons (Clarke and Stewart 1998, 368-69, Cross and Crysler, this volume) . While levels of partisan identification vary across European countries, at the EU level citizens find it hard to view parliamentary elections as a contest between competing political parties, partly because of the weakness of Europe-wide party groups and partly because these elections are often understood as 'second order' politics, that is, commentaries on national politics rather than on EU-level issues (LeDuc, 2007, pp. 142-43) .
Indeed, advocacy groups are increasingly displacing political parties as key conduits of public opinion, though we have yet to understand and assess their connections to electoral authorization (Whiteley, this volume, . As Justin Greenwood notes (2007, p. 180-83) at the EU level, the European Comission has actively promoted the formation of a wide range of Europe-wide groups or associations, in part to gain the benefit of expert input, but also to reinforce the EU's 'input legitimacy' by creating a systematic and transparent process of interaction with a range of civil society interests. Because of the weakness of elections and political parties as 'authorizing' vehicles in the EU, however, interaction with advocacy groups may take on an even greater role there than in most national states.
With respect to inclusion, citizens are formally equal by virtue of the universal franchise. In practice, however, electoral systems add several layers of exclusion. The first layer of exclusion resides in constituency definition: leaving aside problems of drawing boundaries, electoral institutions represent 'the people' only insofar as they are residents of a particular territory. Attributes not tied to geographical residence (e.g., sex, occupation, life-style, class, religion, etc.) are not formally represented (Rehfeld 2005) .
The second layer of exclusion is inherent in the design of electoral systems, simply because they function to produce collective governing capacity under conditions of conflict. But different systems produce different degrees of exclusion. SMP systems in particular exclude minorities. In some cases (Canada at the federal level, for example), SMP systems exclude majorities as well, concentrating power in the hands of representatives of a plurality of voters. In contrast, consensus-based Proportional Representation (PR) systems tend on average to be more inclusive (Lijphart 1999) . But all electoral systems produce legislative bodies that fail the tests of descriptive representation (and thus exclude the perspectives of those most disadvantaged within society), though some systems (party-list PR) tend to do better than others on this measure. A third layer of exclusion concerns the locus of decision-making in complex societies. Even without the first two layers of exclusion, collective decision-making has tended to slip into the hands of administrators over the last several decades-not owing to any conspiracy or even as a consequence of bureaucratic power, but simply owing to a lack of legislative capacity to set more than broad goals for the more complex work of administration. As well, in contemporary, differentiated, market-capitalist societies, governments are also responsive to markets, which tend to shift much social control out of the domain of government altogether Lindblom 2002) . As a strategic consequence, some government agencies are effectively insulated from democratic control (central banks, for example), and some government policies are responsive not to votes or other clearly democratic inputs, but rather to those who control productive resources. The development of the EU in response to economic integration is a case in point (Bellamy and Castiglione 2000) . More generally, the fact that powerful EU institutions, such as the European Commission and the European Council, are only indirectly responsible to the pubic at large raises the possibility that these institutions are more responsive to well organized interests than to the public. The problem is not limited to indirectly responsible institutions. Even elected representative institutions respond better to intense and wellorganized special interests than to latent interests, unorganized interests, and public goods. Because pressure groups tend to represent those with the resources to organize and who care intensely about a single issue, constituency communication may systematically disadvantage public will-formation around common goods. That said, the Commission's efforts to increasing transparency and establish criteria to help assure that groups represent their acclaimed constituencies are reforms that support inclusion (Greenwood, 2007) .
With respect to accountability, the picture is also mixed. On the one hand, the sheer amount of electing has increased steadily in the EU, Canada, and other OECD countries over the last several decades-so much so that while voter turnout has been declining in most elections, the number of times citizens vote-their numbers of trips to the polls-has actually increased over the last several decades (Dalton and Gray 2003) .
On the other hand, while there are many ways and means of introducing accountability, the vote is often a weak mechanism. Voters are often inattentive, information is incomplete, and other forms of power permeate the system, including actors with capacities to provide or withhold economic resources, or administrative officials who have knowledge that representatives cannot match. Citizens often demand contradictory things from government, such as first-rate health care and schools combined with low taxes. And while elections may serve to aggregate preferences into competing packages, they are not very good instruments for stimulating deliberative consideration of collective goals and trade-offs.
Still, there are important differences in the kinds of accountability electoral systems can provide. Westminster systems, for example, specialize in strong retrospective accountability, owing to strong institutional connections between electoral parties and the power of the majority party in parliament to govern. But the costs to inclusion and other forms of accountability are high. In Canada, it is unusual for a government to represent a majority of voters, owing to a combination of regionally strong parties and SMP. Only three times in Canada's history have governments based their power on a majority of voters. When this fact is combined with the Westminster-style concentration of power in the Office of the Prime Minister, the effect is to sever representative linkages to the other parties represented in parliament. The system fails in the deliberative dimension of accountability as well: legislatures should have a deliberative element, which serves a democratic function by displaying before the public reasons for decisions and decision-making (Urbinati 2006) . Because Westminster systems concentrate power in the Office of the Prime Minister, decisions are announced and then defended. In a pure Westminster model, parliament itself is a weak policymaking body, empowered only to say 'yes' or 'no,' and lacking the power or capacity to formulate decisions in deliberation with the affected publics. Because Westminster systems concentrate power, there are few incentives for power-holders to seek out information or deliberate policy options even in the semi-public forums of parliamentary committees, let alone the public forum of the legislature (Peters 1997) . Accountability to citizen is after the fact; when governments miscalculate-as they are often do without inclusive linkages to citizens-they find themselves left with angry or disaffected publics. Of course, this is an all-other-things-being-equal kind of diagnonsis: these effects are mitigated, for example, by minority government, federalism, Senate reform, and parliamentary reform-though many of these characteristics, adopted in the absence of other reforms, are just as likely to produce stalemate as performance, further eroding legitimacy.
Those EU countries that use PR systems present a different kind of accountability problem. Parliamentary styles tend to be more consensual and deliberative, no doubt a structural consequence of the coalition-building required by PR systems as well as systems with effective dual chambers (Lijphart 1999 , Steiner, et. al. 2004 ). For the same reasons, however, it is difficult for citizens to hold any particular party responsible for policies which are often brokered not only among coalition partners, but also between chambers, or (in some cases) between executives and legislatures. The trade-offs between accountability and institutional complexity are characteristic of the EU as well. As DeBardeleben and Hurrelmann (2007b, p. 7) point out, in a complex system like that of the EU, it is difficult to hold any particular institution or individual accountable 'since it is difficult to trace political acts to identifiable agents.' Referring to multilevel governance systems, which include both the EU but also federal states like Canada, they note that blame-shifting by authorities at various levels in the system 'can be used as a political tool by political actors in the face of unpopular policies or policy failure'. In short, there are good reasons to conclude that, however necessary, the traditional and recognizable forms of democratic representation-elected officials convened in representative assemblies such as legislatures, parliaments, and councilsare no longer sufficient to carry out the normative purposes of democratic representation, at least not as stand-alone institutions.
Democratic Deficits in the Participatory Response
Although these observations are not new, they do underscore the degree to which politics-and democratic demand-has flowed into venues outside of electoral representation. The developments are striking. As Dalton, Cain, and Scarrow (2003) the authority granted to them by election, appointment, or expertise insufficient for their decision-making and governance responsibilities. In most areas of public policy, decision-makers have found that standard administrative techniques based on legislative mandates are suboptimal. They may generate unexpected opposition from stakeholders, fail to maximize the effective and efficient use of public resources, lack the legitimacy necessary for public acceptance and cooperation, fall short of substantive goals, such as health, public safety, individual development, or fail to achieve normative ideals, such as distributive justice. Performances that publics judge to be clumsy, inefficient, wasteful, unjust, or unfair can undermine citizens' confidence in public sector organizations, and democracy is impoverished when the citizenry lacks collective agents for public purposes.
Over the last few decades, we have seen an enormous inventiveness in addressing these deficits through new institutions designed, in one way or another, to involve citizens in decision-making (Smith 2009 , Gastil 2008 , Parkinson 2006 , Fung 2006b ). The array of processes and practitioners is now extensive, including, to name a few, referendums, public hearings, public submission processes, client polling, deliberative polling, town hall meetings, citizen juries, citizen assemblies, participatory budgeting, numerous techniques for dialogue, neighbourhood councils, and issues forums. 'Citizen participation' and 'engagement' are typically understood by administrators as one among many strategies for gaining advice, co-opting pressures, and improving services, in this way seeking to increase the legitimacy of their policies (Brown 2006) . The frameworks of engagement usually have administrative rather than 'political' origins. And administrators are typically seeking citizen input rather than citizen empowerment in decision-making.
At the same time, the administrative contexts have perhaps masked the essentially political nature of these developments. We have not really grappled systematically with the question as to what 'more citizen engagement' in this sense would mean for the democratic system as a whole. But we must: these developments are likely to continue, and insofar as democracy is deepening, much of the action is occurring here rather than within formal representative institutions (Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow 2003 , Warren 2002 , Fung 2006b , Smith 2009 ).
At the same time, these new arenas of democratization can cause their own democratic deficits. Referendums, while inclusive of the entire electorate, provide numerous opportunities for interest-group mischief (Pharr and Putnam 2000, 44-8) .
Moreover, as the European constitutional referendums of 2005 demonstrated, they may produce outcomes they are hard to interpret because they force voters into yes/no responses on issues that are inherently complex and multidimensional. Many other kinds of new opportunities for citizen participation are less inclusive because they are based on self-selection, and therefore tend to favour those who are better educated and wealthier, generating the paradox that increasing citizen opportunities for participation may increase political inequality (Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow 2003) 
What Should Be Done?
These considerations should help disaggregate the question as to whether more citizen participation will reduce democratic deficits. There are at least two general areas we shall need to think about, corresponding to two distinct kinds of deficits. The first has to do with deficits in the formal institutions of representative democracy. Democratic deficits in electoral representation are likely to involve incremental reforms of existing institutions, in part because they are not functioning so poorly that they are generating broad constituencies for wholesale changes, and in part because democratizing strategies are subject to limits of scale, complexity, and governability. Our expectations here should probably focus on other goods necessary to a well-functioning democracy such as more responsiveness, high capacities for inclusive deliberation of public matters and decisions, and better performance in governance.
The second area of deficit is in administration and governance, where electorallybased political institutions have inherent incapacities. The potential for more citizen participation is greatest here, owing to the close relationships between policies and interests enabled by their disaggregation and delivery (Warren 2002) . I shall thus distinguish the reform of representative institutions from the retrofitting of these institutions-that is, upgrading their democratic capacities by supplementing them with new democratic devices, primarily in the areas of administration and governance. In both cases, we shall need to imagine institutional changes that build on broader social changes-including increasing advocacy, changing norms of citizenship, and declining deference to authority-while also enhancing system performance.
Reforming institutions
It is easier to generalize about democratic deficits in the developed democracies than about institutional reforms, since the institutional causes of deficits vary with the kind of system. Some systems, Denmark's for example, exhibit few of the deficits 20 evident in the other consolidated democracies (Elklit and Togeby, this volume), probably because of that country's history of supplementing electoral democracy with policyspecific "network governance" (Sørensen and Torfing 2003) . Others, such as Italy's, suffer from gridlock induced by inclusion. In the case of Canada, the institutions suffer from overly concentrated executive powers and parliaments with weak deliberative and policy-making capacities, combined with gridlock in federal-provincial relations. EU institutions are sui generis, although they share some of these institutional problems of national multi-level systems such as Canada's.
We can think of reforms as targeting three kinds of institutions: electoral systems, parliamentary bodies, and constitutions.
Electoral reform
From the perspective of democratic deficits, any reforms should function to make parliaments more inclusive and deliberative, to increase citizen input into policy-making, and to improve and stabilize policy outcomes (Lijphart 1999 , Steiner, et. al. 2004 , Peters 1997 ). In the Canadian case, changing electoral systems from SMP to a PR system such as Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) or Single Transferable Vote (STV) should result in reducing the capacities of prime ministers' offices to make policy in the absence of broad input and deliberation, since powers are more likely to be shared among coalition partners. In addition, fixed election terms are likely to reduce the strategic powers of executives. Both reforms should increase the inclusiveness of electoral representation, which would in turn stabilize and probably improve policy outputs.
Although these reforms might produce parliaments that are more inclusive and deliberative, the impact of electoral reform on citizen participation is likely to be modest at best. In New Zealand, for example, although voter efficacy and perceptions of government responsiveness initially increased, they are again in decline (Banducci, Donovan and Karp 1999) . Japanese voters have become disillusioned with their new electoral system's dual candidacy rules that allow candidates who have narrowly missed out on election in a single member district to return to the Diet via the party list. The new rules function very much like the old rules, in that they still protect incumbents, suppress turnover, and encourage personalistic candidate behaviour (McKean and Schiner 2000. 447) . The lesson may be that those changes that are possible are those that are not likely to have a dramatic impact on political elites and other vested interests.
But even well-designed electoral reforms are unlikely to close democratic deficits.
Nor should we expect them to: given the complexity and scale of government within pluralized contexts populated by multiple powers and actors, it seems unlikely that the standard model of representative democracy-voters elect representatives who develop policy guidelines and direct administrators to execute them-can ever again be adequate, if indeed it ever was. Nonetheless, even if electoral reforms are not sufficient, they may be necessary-particularly in SMP systems-to keep democratic deficits from growing.
Parliamentary reforms
Once voters elect their representatives, the bodies within which they serve should function to form their interests and values into public wills. The design of parliamentary bodies makes a difference. In the Westminster cases (Canada and the UK), parliaments should no doubt be strengthened as representative policy-making bodies relative to prime ministers' offices, with the aim of increasing their capacities to receive and deliberate inputs. These capacities can be increased through a number of reforms, including relaxing Benz, 2008) . These treaty changes, akin to constitutional changes in a national polity, are also efforts to address the EU's democratic deficit.
Constitutional reforms
From a democratic perspective, there may be new roles for checks and balances, which can increase the inclusiveness and responsiveness of political systems by multiplying veto players, as long as mediating institutions exist to avoid conflicting mandates and gridlock, as in the case of Germany. In Canada and the UK, changing upper houses into democratically elected or otherwise democratically legitimate bodies would introduce effective bicameralism, which should also increase the inclusive and deliberative qualities of policy-making (Department for Constitutional Affairs 2003; Gibson 2004) . As in the EU, judicial review should continue to be strengthened and developed, in order to pluralize and regularize points of access to the political system, while dispersing powers of judgment (Cichowski and Stone Sweet 2003) . On average, these reforms should increase the inclusiveness as well as the quality of policy-making. A stronger judiciary and rights-based regime should increase the power and standing of citizens with respect to government, which is in turn likely to show up as increased advocacy, particularly within the arenas of administration and services.
Political party reforms:
Finally, like other institutions within established political systems, political parties have real but constrained potentials for reform. Dramatic changes in party organization of the kind that would respond to declining citizen identification are most likely to follow from changes in electoral systems and parliamentary reforms-changes that would alter the environments and incentive structures to which parties respond. These constraints differ by system, making it difficult to generalize about party reform across the democracies.
But even though institutional contexts vary by country, parties face social and cultural developments across the developed democracies that are much more comparable.
Citizens are less deferential to political elites, more plural in their identities, and more likely to attend to values (Norris 1999 , Dalton 2004 . Citizens are increasingly "postmodern" in Inglehart's sense (1997) . From the citizen's perspective, many representative functions of parties are being displaced by public interest groups. At the same time, the bases of political authority have been shifting. It is not enough to win elections and assume power; it is not even enough to be held to account by an opposition. Government (and the oppositions that hope to succeed them) must continually explain themselves to the public, and do so with every piece of legislation, and with every action and inaction. From one perspective, governing now appears to be a permanent campaign.
From another perspective, however, the bases of political authority have become increasingly discursive and public in nature. Merely winning elections no longer confers the authority necessary to govern.
For these reasons, all parties have struggled over the last few decades to become more internally democratic as well as more attentive to organized advocacy groups, social movements, and the media, while retaining a cohesion sufficient to form platforms, field candidates, and win elections (Kittilson and Scarrow 2004) . Ideally, parties would begin to view themselves as elements of a deliberative political system that generates public legitimacy for their parties and their candidates through public arguments-a trend currently most advanced in American staging of numerous pre-election debates among candidates, organized and moderated by citizen groups and the media (Rosenblum 2008 ).
Still, because parties are creatures of the electoral system combined with constitutionally-determined functions in government or opposition, there are limits to party reform, particularly with regard to their functions in connecting society and government. Parties can translate the voices of organized interests and social movements into legislative bargaining positions, particularly in strong party systems. They are not equipped, however, to represent latent and disaffected interests; nor can they engage publics directly affected by policies on an ongoing basis. Their interests are, in the end, episodic (determined by electoral cycles) and strategic (oriented toward winning elections). Parties succeed when they put together winning coalitions, which means that their concerns and platforms operate at a relatively high level of abstraction when compared to the highly differentiated responses to highly complex societies that responsive governing requires, and of the kind provided, say, by single-issue associations, interest groups, and social movements. Parties are essential for democracy, but their current difficulties are unlikely to be significantly mitigated by internal reforms.
Retrofitting institutions: Supplementary democracy
Institutions can be designed to be more sensitive to information, more deliberative, and more formally inclusive. But for these potentials to be realized there must be connective tissue between institutions and society. The connective tissue needs to perform the political work of defining and engaging the publics affected by policies.
As suggested above, over the last few decades all democratic systems have experimented with new, supplementary conduits for engaging citizens, gaining information, and generating informed public opinion. What is distinctive about these experiments is that they have little to do with organized party politics or formal political institutions. Most are functional and segmented by policy area (Ansell and Gingrich 2003 , Hajer and Wagenaar 2003 , Sørensen andTorfing 2003 , Fung 2006a , 2006b ).
We might think about these new forms of citizen participation as retrofitting formal political institutions with venues designed to gather interests, organize latent public opinion, and, particularly, provide governments with guidance that is not oriented toward strategic electioneering. As also suggested above, however, many of these new forms suffer from their own democratic deficits. Each has strengths and weaknesses: they are more or less inclusive, more or less deliberative, and more or less costly. Each form performs different kinds of political work, from co-opting obstruction to bringing informed 'publics' into existence for future issues. They may generate information; they may produce more just outcomes; they may produce legitimacy; they may institutionalize new forms of learning. Each kind of process has costs: all cost time and money. But many may also generate alienation, provide venues for NIMBYism, and produce outcomes that are substantially more unjust than professional public servants might produce if sheltered from public pressure. What kinds of processes are likely to generate better rather than worse outcomes-more legitimacy, justice, or effectiveness, say-given the characteristics of the issues and the constraints of time and money?
We know pieces of the answers. For example, combining experts with lay citizens over time within a deliberative context can overcome many of the constraints of technical complexity. We know that processes that allow citizens to self-select will bias the process toward organized, high-resource interests, and that random selection can produce a closer approximation of informed public opinion.
But we don't know how to begin with an issue and a set of goals, and then design a democratic process appropriate for these particular goals and constraints. We do, however, have discrete pieces of knowledge and beginnings of middle-level theories that we now need to develop into broader theories and generalizations (Fung 2006b , Parkinson 2006 , Gastil 2008 , Smith 2009 The case of the BC Citizens' Assembly suggests that it is possible in principle to design supplementary forms of democracy in ways that directly address and affect democratic deficits. Our more general understanding of supplementary democracy is, however, still in its infancy. But we should get started, since it is likely that the long-term solutions to democratic deficits will not only reform of our existing institutions, but also retrofitting them with new and innovative forms of democracy.
